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Evidence-based Policies? The Covid-19 Pandemic 
and the Prospects of Evidence Integration 
 




Para justificar sus políticas durante la pandemia de Covid-19, los gobiernos han 
implícitamente recurrido, sobre todo en las fases iniciales, a una versión sesgada de la 
‘medicina basada en la evidencia`, una filosofía de la medicina que se basa especialmente 
en la evidencia computacional y estadística. Este enfoque muestra al menos una debilidad 
relevante: ignora gran parte de las evidencias clínicas y mecanicistas y su potencial contri-
bución a la comprensión y la gestión de le enfermedad. Argumentamos que un enfoque 
pluralista de la evidencia, centrado en la integración, podría apoyar mejor la lucha contra 
esta y futuras pandemias. 
 




In order to justify their policies during the Covid-19 pandemic, governments have 
implicitly appealed, especially in the early phases, to a biased ‘evidence-based’ philosophy 
of medicine heavily relying on computational and statistical evidence. This approach 
shows an important weakness: it largely ignores clinical and mechanistic evidence that 
could greatly contribute to the understanding and management of the disease. We shall 
argue that a pluralistic approach to evidence focused on integration could better support 
the fight against this and future pandemics. 
 




I. PANDEMICS AND PUBLIC HEALTH: A LITMUS TEST FOR 
GOVERNMENTS 
 
The Covid-19 pandemic is an unprecedented litmus test for nation-
al governments and international institutions. It has uncovered, among 
other frailties, the fragility of our health systems, the opacity of the ethi-
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cal framing of governments’ responses as well as flaws in democratic 
processes. Even though governments’ responses have varied, a common 
element in their political narratives can be identified. Governments have 
continuously appealed to the authority of science and the role of evi-
dence in order to justify their response to the Covid-19 pandemic. At the 
very start, it was acknowledged that the evidential basis for governments’ 
policy decisions was meagre. Indeed, the scarcity of the evidential basis 
was a chief factor justifying extreme precautionary measures such as 
lockdowns. Concomitantly, governments have continuously stressed that 
their policy responses are ‘evidence-based’. Independently of whether 
the adoption of a precautionary approach is politically and ethically justi-
fiable in conditions of uncertainty characterised by paucity of evidence, 
there remains an underlying problem concerning the very nature of the 
evidence that should be used in a medical context in order to devise non-
pharmaceutical and medical interventions. After all, different biomedical-
ly-relevant disciplines explicitly or implicitly use different methodologies 
and understand causality in different ways. As a consequence, this varia-
bility in epistemological and ontological commitments might imply the 
adoption of different models of disease. The question is thus raised con-
cerning whether particular disciplines should be given a primary role in 
informing evidence-based policies and whether the prioritisation of cer-
tain kinds of evidence is justified. The philosophy of medicine is instru-
mental in order to uncover the implicit evidential strategy underlying 
governments’ official narrative. We think that the current pandemic of-
fers a significant opportunity to provide such analysis. This is the aim of 
the present paper.  
Let us first characterise the complexity of the current pandemic by 
providing a representation of the variety of medical questions that need 
to be answered. What needs to be known in order to inform appropriate 
and comprehensive evidence-based policy responses is, ideally, reliable 
information about the origin of the virus and of the human infection, the 
way in which it is transmitted between humans, the way in which it in-
fects humans and the way in which humans respond to infection. Sche-
matically, we could categorise the four medically relevant aspects of the 
pandemic as: origin, transmission, organismal infection, organismal re-
sponse (Figure 1). Three important general issues should be highlighted 
in the present context.  
First of all, different scientific disciplines provide the evidential basis 
for understanding the four medically relevant aspects of the pandemic. For 
instance, origin studies require genomic and virological evidence, trans-
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mission dynamics are modelled by epidemiology, infection is approached 
by physiology and clinical studies, while response is the province of im-
munology. Thus, a variety of evidences are relevant to conceptualise and 
understand these different but interrelated aspects of the pandemic.  
Secondly, note that all the evidence potentially affects the way in 
which medical questions are approached, with implications concerning 
how appropriate responses should be devised. For instance, if we were to 
know with precision when the human infection by Sars-Cov-2 started and 
we had detailed information about its transmission dynamics, this would 
potentially impinge on our understanding of populational immunity. 
Thirdly, despite extensive ignorance concerning all these medically 
relevant aspects of the pandemic still impairs interventions, the evidential 
basis has been continuously growing in the past months. Thus, common 
sense dictates that the entire panoply of studies constituting this growing 
evidential basis should ideally inform appropriate evidence-based policies.  
 
 
Figure 1 – The four interrelated medically relevant aspects in the Covid-19 pan-
demic case. An answer to each of these questions would inform appropriate and 
comprehensive evidence-based policy responses. At least transmission, infection 
and response can be approached through a variety of ‘statistical’ (bold type) and 
‘mechanistic’ (italics) approaches. 
 
We shall start (II) by illustrating how the varieties of evidence available 
in current medical science are classified and ranked, the supposed ad-
vantages of hierarchisation and the critiques and alternatives proposed in the 
literature. Based on these considerations, we (III) suggest a way to categorise 
evidence in the case of the current pandemic and argue that an efficient 
management of the emergency requires an approach integrating evidences 
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rather than prioritising them. Finally, we extrapolate (IV) some conclusions 
from the Covid-19 pandemic case tailored to improve policy making. 
 
 
II. EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE: BIOSTATISTICAL EVIDENCE AND 
MODELS VS. MECHANISTIC AND CLINICAL KNOWLEDGE 
 
Medical research has a cognitive and an action-oriented goal [Russo 
and Williamson (2007)]. A variety of disciplinary sources generate a mul-
tiplicity of kinds of evidence available to approach these goals, ranging 
from epidemiology and biostatistics to bioinformatics and genomics, 
from clinical practice and immunology to biochemistry and virology. Ev-
idence gathering methods also cover a wide range: from randomised clin-
ical trials (henceforth RCTs) to individual case reports, from laboratory 
experiments to epidemiological studies, from experts’ opinions to math-
ematical models. All these disciplines and methods supply different kinds 
of information and generalisations for policy action. Selecting, interpret-
ing and amalgamating such abundance of evidence in order to under-
stand which variables are relevant to produce a desired output, and 
through which casual pathways, is a main challenge and an open issue for 
the health sciences [Stegenga (2014)]. The problem is particularly rele-
vant in emergency situations such as the Covid-19 pandemic, whereby 
time limitations and resource constraints require clear and quickly ac-
quired data to inform decision makers. Given this variety of evidences, 
governments have thus significant leeway in deciding to base their poli-
cies on selected epistemological resources rather than others, in follow-
ing the advice of a subset of so-called ‘experts’, in dismissing certain 
policies in the light of ‘insufficient’ evidence etc. The philosophy of med-
icine should play a fundamental role in the critical evaluation of this se-
lection, which otherwise risks, at best, being idiosyncratically changed or, 
at worst, to be guided by spurious interests. 
A widely used heuristic method to order kinds of evidence is to 
rank them with respect to the rigour of the gathering methodology, 
which is inversely proportional to their probability of suffering systematic 
bias [Stegenga (2014)]. More than 80 such rankings, known as ‘evidence 
hierarchies’, are available, among them the U.S. Preventive Services Task 
Force (USPSTF), the Oxford (UK) CEBM Levels of Evidence, and the 
GRADE (Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and 
Evaluation).1 Evidence hierarchies are a main tool in evidence-based med-
icine (henceforth EBM), promoting “the conscientious, explicit and judi-
cious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of 
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individual patients” [Sackett et al. (1996), p. 71]. Emerged in the 90s, 
EBM privileges statistical evidence as ‘best’ in addressing a variety of 
medical situations over (supposedly) biased and observer-dependent clin-
ical evidence or evidence of pathophysiological mechanisms of organis-
mal response to disease, produced by clinical practitioners appealing to 
probably outdated theories and models [Davidoff et al. (1995)]. The cur-
rent emphasis on statistical research, ‘data-driven’ science and medical in-
formatics, and its collateral effect of dispensing of observational, clinical 
and mechanistic evidence, come from this intransigent empiricist focus.  
Meta-analyses of large-scale epidemiological studies are usually 
placed at the top of hierarchies, followed by RCTs; while case reports 
and expert opinions are usually placed at the bottom. A main distinction 
behind hierarchies has to do with the systematicity of reviews. Meta-
analyses are systematic in that they are based on focused clinical ques-
tions, clearly stated sources and search strategy, thus offering qualitative 
summary with statistical synthesis. The scope of narrative reviews such 
as expert opinions or individual case studies is often broader, with the 
implication that they might suffer from bias in their sources and offer 
only qualitative results [Cook & Mulrow & Haynes (1997)]. Figure 2-TOP 
shows a typical evidence hierarchy. 
Hierarchies and their rationale have been thoroughly criticised [Pet-
ticrew & Roberts (2003); Clarke et al. (2013)]. Stegenga (2014) underlines 
that actual studies might be poor applications of ideal methodologies 
(e.g., some RCTs are poorly reliable), that rankings should depend on the 
type of hypothesis tested (e.g., the potential harm of an intervention is 
usually discovered through observation of individual cases, not RTCs), 
and that they are based on few parameters (basically randomisation), be-
ing as a consequence very ‘crude’ tools. Moreover, hierarchies do not pro-
vide ways to amalgamate evidences from different sources, but just suggest 
ignoring those at the bottom. This fundamental point is developed in sec-
tion 3. Alternative classifications have been proposed. Bluhm (2005), p. 
535, suggests replacing the hierarchy of evidence “by a network that takes 
into account the relationship between epidemiological and laboratory re-
search”. Petticrew and Roberts (2003) build an evidence matrix where each 
evidence-gathering method is assigned a score from 1 to 3 in several dif-
ferent respects (effectiveness, safety, appropriateness): so that, say, RCTs 
score high in safety but low in acceptability by patients. Cartwright and 
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The top and the bottom layers of the evidence hierarchies are occu-
pied by families of methods (roughly) identifiable, respectively, with a prob-
abilistic and a mechanistic approach. Both kinds of methods are required to 
generate evidence: probabilities show that causes might affect effects, while 
mechanisms explain the putative nature of the causal pathway [Russo & 
Williamson (2007), Clarke et al. (2014), Grüne-Yanoff (2016)]. The proba-
bilistic approach (underlying, e.g., systematic reviews, RCTs) looks for sta-
tistical relationships among the variables of a chosen system (e.g., a 
population), so that its behaviour can be predicted and manipulated, without 
caring much about the nature of the putative causal relationships: its results 
(e.g., RCT data) are supposedly theory-free. Conversely, the mechanistic ap-
proach (underlying, e.g., laboratory experiments, theoretical arguments), en-
dorses the view that causal connections are the result of physical processes 
and not just probabilistic correlations: it explains and predicts by studying 
how the system’s entities and activities shape its behaviour [Illari & Wil-
liamson (2012)]. Both interpretations are defended and criticised for specu-
lar reasons. 
Populations, organisms, cells or physiological pathways are complex 
systems decomposable in different ways and whereby a number of entities 
with differing activities simultaneously interact and produce a large number 
of phenomena of biomedical interest. Identifying relevant variables, isolating 
them from interferences, and classifying them as causes or effects are ele-
ments of a titanic task, and each approach is especially good at handling 
some of these elements and bad at handling others. Pluralistic approaches 
suggest amalgamating, rather than ranking, evidence of different kinds [Rus-
so & Williamson (2007), Illari (2011)]. Mechanistic evidence can, for exam-
ple, clarify whether a statistical regularity reflects a causal relationships 
between two variables A and B, or whether it is accidental, or even due to a 
confounding variable C influencing both A and B and thus causing a spuri-
ous association.2 Mechanisms, moreover, support the translation of a suc-
cessful policy to a different environment (e.g., a RCT to a real population, or 
a population study to an individual case), something that a crude statistical 
association can hardly do [this is known as the ‘external validity’ problem, cf. 
Victora & Habicht & Bryce (2004)]. Finally, mechanistic hypotheses are 
needed for the design of probabilistic studies, to identify which variables are 
relevant, etc. [Clarke et al. (2014)]. Probabilistic evidence can, on the other 
hand, help detecting and avoiding the problem of masking [Illari (2011)], or 
the contemporaneous existence of several mechanisms linking variable A to 
variable B. If increasing A reduces B according to a mechanistic model, it 
might well increase B due to a second, not considered, mechanism. Some 
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authors deny any distinction between mechanistic and probabilistic evidence 
claiming that, ultimately, the methods, scope and level of analysis of statisti-
cal and mechanistic approaches have a common core - focusing instead on 
whether the evidence indicates ‘difference-making’: if not, neither probabilis-
tic nor mechanistic evidence is useful for policy extrapolation [Marchionni 
and Rejiula (2018)]. Independently of whether evidence type, evidence gath-
ering method and object of evidence are conceptualized and discriminated 
by pluralistic approaches, we shall emphasise the importance of evidential 
integration on the generation, refinement and testing of the hypotheses for-
mulated by using different methodologies (section III.5).  
 
 
III. PRIORITISATION VS. INTEGRATION OF EVIDENCES 
 
As we anticipated in section 1, many disciplines contribute to the four 
medically relevant aspects of the pandemic. An overwhelming amount of 
data is thus available, provided by governmental health agencies, interpreted 
by teams of experts and used to fuel mathematical modelling to support 
policy making. More than 36.000 documents are available on the WHO 
website,3 of which less than 10% are classified according to EBM hierar-
chies. Of these, almost 1/3 are ‘case studies’ (a type of evidence at the bot-
tom of evidential hierarchies), while controlled clinical trials (a type of 
evidence at the top of evidential hierarchies) represent just 5% of the total. 
We categorise some of this abundant information by distinguishing compu-
tational, statistical, observational and mechanistic kinds of evidence. Our 
aim is not to create a new exhaustive classification of evidential kinds (see 
section II and Higgins JPT 2009). The more modest aim is to refer to kinds 
of evidence available for Covid-19 as a guide for substantiating our argu-
ment that their relative weaknesses could, through amalgamation, provide a 
more solid basis for policy making [Illari (2011)]. The commonsense ap-
proach we propose is that to privilege one kind of evidence over others as a 
panacea for protecting the human population is meaningless. We shall ar-
gue that the current pandemic highlights the fundamental point that amal-
gamation and integration of evidence kinds should be the driving force 
behind any governments’ attempt to devise non-pharmaceutical and medi-
cal interventions, being they tailored to reduce contagion, finding medical 
treatments or understanding immunity.  
 
III.1 Computational Evidence 
Governments’ initial policy reactions to the pandemic were focused 
on managing (either delaying, mitigating or suppressing) transmission by 
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heavily relying on mathematical modelling. The understandable reason is 
that we knew almost nothing about organismal infection and response, 
while origin hypotheses are to this day speculative. As a consequence, 
more than 40 epidemiological models were already available at the be-
ginning of April [Jefferson and Heneghan (2020)]. Mathematical epide-
miology provides statistical evidence that policy interventions of specific 
kinds will have predictable effects, more often than not within very sig-
nificant thresholds. The dynamics of the spread of the virus and its ef-
fects on the population in terms of morbidity and death are modelled 
without focusing on the biological complexity of the individual organ-
isms and their specific and idiosyncratic responses. As a consequence, 
individual organisms are ascribed a probability of getting infected, of 
ending up in hospital and of dying [these are known as SIR models, cf. 
Kermack, and McKendrick (1927) for the original model or Harko, Lo-
bo and Mak (2014) for advanced applications to pandemics].  
Models are powerful tools but, of course, have limitations. One must 
not forget that their semantic is context-dependent. The reliability of a mod-
el depends on how its software has been conceived and built. Its simulations 
can be considered significant insofar as the data it is fuelled by is reliable. 
This is the well-known GIGO, or ‘Garbage-In-Garbage-Out’ problem: the 
limitations of the input data should be clearly stated and sensitivity analysis 
performed, which has not occurred in the case of most of the Covid-19 
models [Jefferson and Heneghan (2020)]. All of these limitations are evident 
when we consider the main epidemiological model for Covid-19, the Impe-
rial College London simulator, which has triggered the U-turn in UK’s poli-
cy by forecasting half a million deaths in case no non-pharmaceutical 
interventions were taken. Firstly, its objectives are not clearly stated (i.e., 
software specification is lacking). Secondly, the significance and reliability of 
its predictions is questionable as the input data is itself questionable. Finally, 
it does not comply with software engineering standards [Horner and Sy-
mons (2020), Singh Chawla (2020)]. This lack of transparency is frustrating 
as it poses an obstacle to the policy ideal of informing scientific community 
and public at large. Particularly significant have been the use of putatively in-
flated variables [e.g., infection fatality rate, cf. Verity et al. (2020)] and the 
underestimation of other variables (e.g., percentage of asymptomatic patients 
acting as vectors of contagion). These are not idle issues because simulations 
have not only played a prominent role in inducing lockdowns, but still play a 
pivotal role in policy decisions concerning easing restrictions and reintroduc-
ing local lockdowns. Ultimately, computational evidence is – independently 
of the quality of the modelling substantiating it – of limited importance in 
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finding a way out in the management of the disease: the medical value of 
non-pharmaceutical interventions can only go as far as either curbing conta-
gion (through tighter social restrictions) or even effectively fostering popula-
tion immunity (through social restrictions relaxation).  
 
III.2 Statistical evidence 
The emphasis on quantitative statistical research, meta-analysis, ‘data-
driven’ science and medical informatics at the root of orthodox evidence-
based medicine comes from an arguably intransigent empiricist focus [Co-
hen et al. (2004)]. Getting rid of theory is one aspect of this endeavour. 
Getting rid of rich interpretations of causality is another (in the Humean 
spirit of dismissing as unscientific reference to the unobservable processes 
underlying medically relevant causal relations).4 The two aspects are interre-
lated and tailored to downplay theory-rich observational, clinical and mech-
anistic studies that make reference to putative genuine causal relations 
rather than mere statistical correlations. There is no denying that statistical 
studies and meta-analysis of several observational and clinical studies are 
biomedically crucial. But to extrapolate an over-arching philosophy of med-
icine from statistical correlations remains philosophically blind-sighted. The 
flimsy empiricist basis of orthodox evidence-based medicine has already 
been criticised, for instance by Russo & Williamson (2007) and Clarke et al. 
(2013). We concur with the pluralistic and integrative ethos of such criti-
cisms. In this context, we would like to highlight two medically relevant ex-
amples pointing in the same direction: biomedicine as a multi-disciplinary 
area of studies should be also informed by theoretical insights and mecha-
nistic reasoning [Marchionni & Reijula (2018)] and should also aim at 
providing mechanistic evidence in favour of medical interventions.  
The first drug that has been shown to reduce Covid-19 mortality is 
dexamethasone, which appears to stop the damage of the severe immune 
reaction (i.e., ‘cytokine storm’) often observed clinically in severely ill pa-
tients. A RCT was run and the drug found effective. This seems a very 
powerful argument for prioritising statistical evidence coming from RCTs. 
However, the insight for running the RCT was inevitably theoretical. In 
fact, it is known that steroids suppress the immune system, which could 
provide some relief for patients whose lungs are ravaged by an over-active 
immune response.5 In this case, a theoretical insight temporally prior to the 
decision to perform RCTs shows how statistical evidence is parasitic on 
theoretical knowledge. 
An instructive example of misapplication of statistical thinking is race 
medicine, the hypothesis that the human population can be racially carved 
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genetically with precision and that such carving can serve a predictive func-
tion in medical contexts. However, genomics and molecular studies often 
debunk this hypothesis [Cooper et al. (2003)]. For instance, in the case of 
HCV (hepatitis C virus infection), it had long been noted that medical 
treatment of individuals of self-professed African ancestry was less success-
ful than treatment of individuals of self-professed Caucasian and Asian de-
scent. The reason seems to be that individuals of African origin more often 
– but not universally – possess (compared to Caucasian and Asian individu-
als) a DNA sequence (i.e., IL28B) coding for a protein (i.e., interferon-λ-3) 
that plays a disruptive role when HCV treatments are administered. Thus 
“The profile based on race to predict treatment success rate in the past is 
now proven to be overly simplified. It is actually the IL28B genotype that 
plays a major role in determining treatment response, not ethnicity….” 
[Fan Lu et al. (2014), p. 8]. What we would like to highlight in this case is 
the interplay between the sophisticated statistical analysis of the genome 
wide association studies and the theoretically-rich understanding of an im-
munological mechanism at the molecular level, that is, in a way, the transi-
tion from statistically-based race medicine to a molecular understanding 
that is more in line with the ethos of personalised medicine.  
 
III.3 Observational evidence 
Clinicians have experimented during the pandemic with a variety of 
treatments whose safety and relative effectiveness should, it goes without 
saying, eventually be justified through RCTs.6 Nonetheless, as we said in 
the previous sub-section, the division of medical labour heavily relies on 
the temporal primacy of theoretical and clinical insights. Given their privi-
leged knowledge of the interaction between humans and pathogens, clini-
cians can thus hypothesise the efficacy of a medical intervention and the 
nature of the relationships between different classes of patients and dis-
ease. The pandemic case offers a test for such medical practices of course.  
Cohort studies in particular, which have been disparaged by over-
zealous evidence-based medicine supporters [Cohen et al. (2004), p. 38], 
play a clear role in devising medical interventions. For instance, in one co-
hort study it was tested whether Tocilizumab might be an effective treat-
ment for severely ill Covid-19 patients [Guaraldi et al. (2020)]. Studies of 
such kind are preliminary to RCTs, further demonstrating the role of theo-
retical and clinical insights in medicine. In another study, it was tested 
whether the lethality of Sars-CoV-2 had decreased over time [Flacco et al. 
(2020)]. This study – whose rationale was clinical (i.e., the observation that 
the virulence of the virus had diminished over time given the difference in 
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viral load between the testing swabs collected, respectively, in March and 
May, in Italian hospitals) – might be important to revise the inputs of epi-
demiological models. However, ‘low-quality’ evidence of this kind is often 
dismissed in the spirit of evidential prioritisation and hierarchisation. 
 
III.4 Mechanistic evidence 
The history of medicine points to the primary causal role of mecha-
nistic reasoning and evidence. Take the HIV global epidemic (or pandem-
ic). The breakthrough in managing the global epidemic did not come from 
statistical analysis or epidemiological modelling, but thanks to mechanistic 
studies. Mechanistic research underpinned by conceptual models and hy-
potheses coming from virology, immunology and molecular biology al-
lowed the targeted search for drugs that could be used in order to inhibit 
the virus’ life cycle in a variety of ways: its entry in the cell, the proliferation 
of its RNA in the cytoplasm, the integration of its genome within the host’s 
genome etc. For instance, the first drug developed (i.e., AZT, a nucleoside 
reverse transcriptase inhibitor) targeted the reverse transcription capabilities 
of the virus. The rationale of our capacity to manage the HIV global epi-
demic is that mechanistic science has allowed the generation of a therapy 
with antiretroviral drugs: instead of nullifying the presence of the virus in 
the organism, and in the absence of a vaccine, we reduce its viral load, 
transforming a viral infection that was initially a death sentence into a 
chronic condition.  
In analogy with the HIV case, mechanistic research should play a 
prominent role in the case of the current pandemic. Putative knowledge 
about the ways in which cellular infection and responses occur as well as 
the ways infection and response are mediated by organismal constituents 
(e.g., proteins, antibodies, T-cells) potentially leads to appropriate medical 
interventions. A thoroughly mechanistic understanding of Sars-CoV-2 in-
teraction with organismal hosts is at the basis of the experimentation with 
Remdesivir. The extemporaneous treatment trialled by clinicians in the early 
phases of the pandemic is ultimately motivated by the theoretical conceptu-
alisation of the drug’s action and its potential to disrupt the virus’ life cycle. 
Even though we do not know much about Sars-CoV-2, we know it’s a 
coronavirus – for which, significantly, there were until the end of 2020 no 
available vaccines – and we have sequenced its genome. On this basis, we 
can make inferences about its life cycle and the proteins it uses in order to 
infect the human hosts. This knowledge allows to conceptualise mechanis-
tically the ways in which the virus infects cells and replicates and, as a con-
sequence, to devise potential medical interventions (Figure 3). 
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der to produce a nucleoside triphosphate that is eventually recruited by the 
viral RNA polymerase. The upshot is that the viral RNA polymerase is 
tricked into recruiting an artificial analogue of a natural nucleoside triphos-
phate, but such recruitment slows down transcription by delaying chain 
termination. Remdesivir is hypothesised to interact with a specific residue 
of the RNA polymerase. Furthermore, Remdesivir only disrupts viral – but 
not human - transcription because human RNA polymerases do not recruit 
it. This means that human physiological processes are not impaired.  
Mechanistic studies of this kind are arguably the best prospect we 
have to manage through medical interventions this pandemic. As East-
man et al. (2020), p. 680, claim “Repurposing or repositioning an effec-
tive small-molecule therapeutic promises to be the fastest therapeutic 
means to stem the tide of the pandemic.”  
 
III.5 Integration 
The current pandemic clearly shows, in our opinion, that a truly ev-
idence-based medicine must integrate computational, statistical and non-
statistical sources of medical information and that this requires, in the 
end, also qualitative evidence clinically gathered concerning single pa-
tients, cohorts and, arguably most importantly, evidence concerning the 
mechanisms underlying the physiological and immunological responses of 
single patients over which inductive generalisations can be founded. By in-
tegration we refer to the reciprocal influence that different kinds of evi-
dence have on the generation, refinement and testing of the hypotheses 
formulated by using different methodologies. Let us give some examples. 
The causal role of asymptomatic patients in transmission had been 
grossly underestimated as an artefact of the influenza model originally cho-
sen as the basis of the Imperial College London simulator, but several clini-
cal [Lavezzo et al. (2020)] and statistical studies [Beale et al. (2020)] have 
indicated that asymptomatic patients are much more common that original-
ly thought; the non-pharmaceutical interventions proposed to curb trans-
mission on this basis were ineffective (for instance leading to neglecting the 
testing of nurses working in several care homes) and modelling has been re-
fined as a consequence. Mechanistic evidence can also contribute to testing 
the efficacy of the non pharmaceutical interventions extrapolated from 
computational models. For instance, if long lasting protective immunity to 
Sars-CoV-2 turns out to be also dependent on T-cell responses and not 
merely antibodies [Sekine et al. (2020)], a mechanistic insight would con-
tribute to explaining the inefficacy of certain kinds of restrictions (e.g., clos-
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ing schools). Several kinds of evidence (clinical, statistical and mechanistic) 
thus heavily inform modelling and the testing of modelling predictions. 
Analogously, statistical studies cannot per se be an appropriate basis 
for the needed non-pharmaceutical and medical interventions to come out 
of the current pandemic for a variety of reasons. First, statistical studies are 
often temporally and epistemologically parasitic on the theoretical insights 
provided by mechanistic reasoning and clinical evidence. Secondly, as we 
already anticipated in section III.2, testing the hypothesis concerning the 
effectiveness of a medical intervention gathered through an RCT often re-
quires mechanistic evidence. The reason is that the hypothesis is relative to 
the population of reference used in the RCT but cannot be extrapolated in-
discriminately to, for instance, all individual patients. The translation of the 
populational effectiveness of a drug to the individual might require more 
refined population stratification on the basis of mechanistic knowledge (as 
the race medicine case illustrated in section III.2 shows). At the same time, 
RCTs are necessary to test the populational effectiveness of medical inter-
ventions. In this respect, it goes without saying that Remdesivir’s effec-
tiveness is not merely mechanistically justifiable. In fact, at least 10 global 
clinical trials are currently registered [Eastman et al. (2020), cf. figure 4 and 
table 1].7 This means, more generally, that the so-called ‘low-quality’ evi-
dence coming from cohort and other qualitative and observational studies 
should be assessed according to stringent statistical parameters instead of 
being dismissed in the spirit of evidential prioritisation and hierarchisation. 
The same applies to mechanistic evidence. It would be preposterous to 
dismiss mechanistic evidence as necessarily local and organism-specific. 
The inductive extrapolation basis of mechanistic studies is founded on the 
similarities between varieties of biological entities: by assumption, most 
human cells are similar enough to allow diffusion of Remdesivir and most 
Sars-CoV-2 viruses are similar enough to use an RNA polymerase for 
transcription. Given these biological similarities, local mechanistic explana-
tions become amenable to be generalisable. At the same time, while exper-
imentation in vivo is of course key to such studies, RCTs are necessary. 
Their calibration is essential. 
An illustrative example of integration of evidences concerns the testing 
of the medical benefits of vitamin C administration to Covid-19 patients. On 
the one hand, physiological pathways have been analysed in order to mech-
anistically conceptualise how vitamin C might counteract the infection. Erol 
(2020) draws a typical mechanistic diagram showing how vitamin C acts 
within the body (Figure 4-top). On the other hand, a RCT aimed to investi-
gate the effectiveness of vitamin C administration in the case of Sars-CoV-2 
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patients developing pneumonia has begun in Wuhan, China [Carr (2020)]. 


























Figure 4 – (TOP) Mechanistic description of action of vitamin C against Covid-
19 virus [from Erol (2020)]. (BOTTOM) Clinical trial description and parameters 
[Carr (2020)]. 
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Another example concerns the use of plasma from recovered pa-
tients to supply antibodies to infected patients. Presented as a successful 
treatment in some hospitals in Northern Italy,8 it has been put into 
doubt by a recent RTC [Li, Zhang, Hu et al. (2020)].  
Importantly, integration is not unidirectional (in the sense, for in-
stance, that statistical studies provide the basis to test mechanistic and 
observational ‘low-quality’ hypotheses but not vice-versa) but multidirec-
tional. An enlightening example of multidirectional evidential integration 
is the study by Garvin et al. (2020). First, the gene expression patterns 
relative to Covid-19 patients’ bronchoalveolar lavage fluid cells are com-
pared to the same type of cells from a control group. Gene expression 
data provide crucial information concerning the molecular resources 
(e.g., proteins) used by the cells of the organism in response to viral in-
fection. A supercomputer is used to analyse this data set. Given that we 
already possess a mechanistic model of good cellular physiology (in itself 
a statistical construct based on what is common to ‘good’ cells’ physio-
logical behaviour), on the basis of the analysed gene expression data it 
can be inferred that certain kinds of disruption to the normal physiologi-
cal pathways might be correlated to disease. On this partially computa-
tional, statistical and mechanistic basis, the authors propose that the 
peptide bradykinin plays a crucial role in infection and that the ‘bradykin-
in storm’ (basically an overproduction of this peptide) is at the basis of 
many Covid-19 symptoms. Thirdly, the authors of this study identify 
some already approved drugs that might potentially defuse the ‘bradykin-
in storm’, proposing RCTs to test their effectiveness for Covid-19. In 
brief, several types of evidence fuel the various stages of a study adopt-
ing a multiplicity of methodologies. In the end, to consider such studies 
exemplars of statistical or mechanistic science seems to us meaningless. 
The desperate need for integration in the current pandemic case is 
in our opinion just common-sensical, especially given the variety of med-
ically relevant issues that need to be tackled (Figure 1) and the multifari-
ous nature of the interventions that need to be devised by policy makers 
in order to manage the pandemic. 
 
 
IV. EVIDENCE INTEGRATION IMPROVES PANDEMIC MANAGEMENT 
 
We started by highlighting that many medically relevant aspects of 
the pandemic should be tackled in order to manage its course effectively. 
In order to do so, we can rely, as we have shown, on a multiplicity of 
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kinds of evidence. Indeed, evidence related to the four medically relevant 
aspects of Covid-19 is in some cases abundant. In this situation, the ap-
peal by decision-makers to ‘evidence-based’ policies is partially ironic and 
partially worrying. It is partially ironic because, for instance, both Sweden’s 
and other European countries’ strategies were – initially – in many ways 
opposite to each other but, nominally, equally ‘science-based’. More im-
portantly for our argument, it is partially worrying because, despite appear-
ing as a sound approach at first sight, evidence-based policy-making is 
problematic when framed in terms of evidence prioritisation. To some 
researchers, contemporary biomedical science seems to be especially fo-
cused on statistical studies and probabilistic modelling, at the expense of 
mechanistic and observational evidence. Following this provocative in-
terpretation, it could be argued that the current pandemic clearly exhibits 
the lurking clash between, on the one hand, ‘statistical technocrats’ 
[Charlton & Miles (1998)] with their smug prioritisation of medical evi-
dence and, on the other, ‘old-fashioned’ clinicians and mechanistic scien-
tists whose focus is on the causal interaction between the patient-
organism and the disease-pathogen. We do not believe that statistical 
technocrats want to rule the world. At the same time, when the bias in 
favour of statistical evidence is formalised by the use of hierarchies, there 
are reasons to be worried. We argued that evidence prioritisation is prob-
lematic, impoverishes biomedical research and, as we shall relate briefly, 
impairs policy-making. The alternative we propose is evidence integra-
tion, an approach that, instead of prioritising types of evidence on the 
basis of potential bias, aims to enhance the reciprocal influence that dif-
ferent kinds of evidence have on the generation, refinement and testing 
of the hypotheses formulated by using different methodologies. This ap-
proach has the virtue of respecting the richness of the biomedical scienc-
es, including the paramount role played by clinical research, small-scale 
observational studies and mechanistic research. We illustrated several ex-
amples of evidence integration in section III.5. We also tried to show 
that many studies are, as a matter of fact, multi-methodological, giving 
further reasons to think that the lurking clash between technocrats and 
mechanistic scientists might, as a matter of fact, amount to an overinter-
pretation. 
We would now like to argue that evidence integration is important 
for policy making for the following reasons. The first is obvious. Given 
that the management of the pandemic requires different kinds of inter-
ventions, focus on one type of evidence is simplistic. In this respect, 
modelling is important for studying and controlling transmission, that is, 
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devising non-pharmaceutical interventions; conversely, mechanistic stud-
ies and observational surveys are more important to devise pharmaceuti-
cal interventions which will be sanctioned in terms of safety and 
population effectiveness by RCTs. This is a trivial point that, however, 
should not be forgotten as it shows that the division of medical labour is 
essential and that the relevance of a type of evidence is correlated to the 
medical aspect of interest and the kind of intervention sought. Most im-
portantly, as we have extensively shown in section III.5, the significance 
of all kinds of evidence influences all other kinds of research, be it by re-
fining models, triggering RCTs or testing mechanistic hypotheses. It 
seems to us unreasonable to regard a kind of evidence as superior, par-
ticularly when such prioritisation judgement is independent of the kind 
of intervention taken into consideration. 
The second point we would like to make concerns the role of gov-
ernments. Simplistically, it could be argued that devising pharmaceutical 
interventions is not the province of governments’ action, as such role lies 
purely on ‘self-organising’ science. This idealistic picture of value-free 
science becomes particularly problematic during the current pandemic, 
which has seen an unprecedented – and in our opinion ethically justifia-
ble – level of governmental intervention on scientific research. Read-
dressing scientific agendas can be done in several different ways. What 
we suggest is that governments should play such role in a balanced way, 
in at least two respects. In a first respect, it should not be biased by being 
implicitly based on evidence prioritisation. Take as an example the idio-
syncratic policies concerning the use of face masks: there is a lack of 
RCTs concerning their effectiveness [MacIntyre and Chughtai (2015)], but 
their mandatory use has been locally justified through experts’ opinions 
and folk-mechanistic understanding of how the virus spreads. A govern-
mental intervention might transform this folk-mechanistic knowledge into 
good evidence, for instance by funding an engineering study. Another 
possible area of intervention – among an indefinite set – is financing the 
development of more reliable and comprehensive antigenic tests, in 
which case mechanistic knowledge is essential. In the second respect, 
governments’ power to readdress scientific agendas should be balanced 
in the sense of not being biased to seek only non-pharmaceutical inter-
ventions. Of course, most governments have directed substantial 
amounts of public money to vaccine research, considered one of the 
most promising pharmaceutical interventions. And many governments 
have directly funded extensive RCT programmes for already available 
drugs. However, given their power in readdressing the scientific agenda 
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with directed funding programmes, when eventually the emphasis on 
transmission control wears off, the more the need to invest in mechanis-
tic research is justified. In case vaccines in development and already 
available drugs turn out to be ineffective, drug development will neces-
sarily have to rely on fundamental mechanistic research in pathophysiol-
ogy and immunology. 
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This article was written in July 2020. Our understanding of the Covid-19 
disease has substantially increased since then. Therefore, the reader might find 
some references and examples outdated. Nevertheless, the authors believe that 
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2 A text-book example of confounding variable is atmospheric pressure, 
whose reduction causes at the same time the fall in barometer reading and the 
storm: a pure statistical analysis would consider changes in barometer reading as 
difference-making causes with respect to weather.  
3 https://search.bvsalud.org/global-literature-on-novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov/, data 
retrieved June 26th, 2020. 
4 The probabilistic interpretation of causality has a long tradition in Eng-
lish philosophy. It started at least with Hume’s ‘Treatise’ and was formalised in 
Stuart Mill’s ‘Logic’, whose method looks for regularities allowing predictions, 
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and not for the causes of the effects behind these regularities. An interesting 
analysis of this tradition is found in Gadamer’s ‘Truth and Method’, section I.1.a 
5 https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-01824-5 
6 However, as we argue more in detail in 3.5, this does not mean that their 
relative effectiveness at the population level can be translated to their effective-
ness at the individual patient level or to a population with different characteris-
tics (e.g., the external validity problem, see section 2). 
7 An interim trial-result by the WHO seems to refute the hypothesis that 
Remdesivir is an effective drug for Covid-19 treatment. Nonetheless, the US 
Food and Drug Administration has approved it. (https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/ 
10.1056/NEJMoa2007764) 
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